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Morse: Eye-Witness: Television's Expanding Coverage of the Court
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(stating that the ultimate aim of copyright law is to stimulate the
creation of useful works for the general public good).
6. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914; see also 1 MELvIuE NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT,. 1.03[A], at 1-31.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (This section grants "Exclusive
Rights in Copyrighted Works" and begins with the phrase "Subject
to sections 107 through 118...").
8. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See also Lisa Vaughn Merrill,
Should Copyright Law Make Unpublished Works Unfair Game?, 51
OHIO ST. LJ.1399, 1400 (Fall 1990).
9. 17 U.S.C. 5 107.
10. The owner of a copyright has the following exclusive
rights:(1) the reproduction right; (2) the derivative work right; (3)
the distribution right; (4) the performance right (publicly); and (5)
the display right (publicly). See 17 U.S.C. §106.
11. Andrea D. Williams, FairUse Doctrine and Unpublished
Works, 34 How. L.J.
115 (1991). See 17 U.S.C. S 107.
12. Vincent H. Peppe, FairUse of UnpublishedMaterials in
the Second Circuit- The Letters of the Law, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV.417,
419 (1988).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
14. Id.
15. H.R. RP. No. 836, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1992).
16. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S.
539 (1985) (finding that defendant had the intended purpose of
supplanting the copyright holder's right of first publication).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 542.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 543.
21. Id.
22. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 557 F.
Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2nd Cir. 1983),
rev'd 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
23. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 557
F.Supp. at 1072-1073.
24. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723
F.2d at, 209-209 (2nd Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
25. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 439
U.S. at, 569 (1985).
26. Id. at 554.
27. Id. at 553.
28. Id. at 564.
29. Id. at 569.
30. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2nd Cir. 1987);
New Era Publ. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.),
reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1094 (1990). See 138 CONG. REc., S17358 (daily ed. October 7, 1992)
(joint statement).
31. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d at 92-94.
32. Id. at 96.
33. New Era Publishers Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F.
Supp. 1493,1497 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
34. Id. at 1498.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1507-1508.
37. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d at 583.
38. New Era Publishers Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
at 584. In New Era, the court stated that the publisher of a biography on L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology,
had infringed upon copyrights of Hubbard's unpublished diaries
and journals by publishing portions of them. However, the court
did not order an injunction due to plaintiff's unreasonable delay in
commencing the lawsuit. Id.
39. Williams, supra note 11, at 129.
40. 138 CONG. REc. S17358, supranote 30.
41. Diane Conley, (FairUse, FairGame), LEGAL TIMES, June
17, 1991, at 45.
42. S. REP.No. 141, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess. 4 (1991).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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45. Id. at 5.
46. 17 U.S.C. S 107.
47. Search of LEXIS, LEGIS library, Bill Tracking file (April
16, 1993).
48. Pub. L. No. 102-492, supranote 1.
49. 138 CONG. REc., S17358, supra note 30.
50. Id
51. H. REP. No. 836, supra note 15, at 9.
52. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S.
at 553. See 138 CONG. REc. S.17358, supranote 30.
53. H. REP. No. 836, supranote 15, at 9.
54. Id.
55. Pierre N. Leval, Comment, Toward a FairUse Standard,
103 HARV. L. Ray. 1105, 1130 (1990).
56. H. PEP. No. 836, supranote 15, at 4.

Eye-Witness:
Television's Expanding
Coverage of the Court
"The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was.., to create a fourth institution outside the
Government as an additional check on
the three official branches."
-Justice

Potter Stewart'

From the murder trial of Lindberg baby kidnapper
Bruno Hauptmann in 19352 to the more recent rape
trial of William Kennedy Smith,' the national debate
continues over the issue of whether and under what
circumstances cameras should be permitted in the
courtroom. Proponents of electronic media coverage
in the halls of justice have long waved the standards
of the First Amendment's freedom of press and the
Sixth Amendment's right to a public trial.' Opponents
have decried the media as intrusive and voyeuristic in
an atmosphere that some hold as sacred as the confessional.
Nearly sixty years ago, the flashbulbs and microphones wielded by the media at the Hauptmann trial
were denounced as "inconsistent with the dignity and
decorum of judicial proceedings."' Today, the physical presence of a television camera in a courtroom is
no longer viewed as undignified. But objections
remain as to the effect that electronic media coverage
may have on the audiences they reach, and more
importantly, on the testimony of witnesses.6
Part I of this Update will examine the history of
cameras in the courtroom and the reasons why their
acceptance in federal and state courts had been
barred until relatively recently. 7 Part II will analyze the
rules governing the use of cameras in federal courtrooms under a federal experimentation program currently in progress. Finally, Part III will balance the
right of the trial victim or witness to block the televising of his or her testimony against the public benefits
from viewing "real" court proceedings devoid of any
fictional television drama. This Update concludes with
an appraisal of expansion of cameras in the courtroom on a case-by-case basis.
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HISTORY OF COURTROOM MEDIA COVERAGE
Over a half century ago, when major cities had
three or four daily newspapers, media coverage of
courtroom activities was in its infancy stages, but the
American public was already exercising its right to
know that justice was being served.$ In 1925, an
attentive audience listened while Chicago-based WGN
Radio broadcasted arguments proffered in support of
the theories of evolution and creationism during the
famous Scopes "Monkey" trial." By 1935, when over
130 reporters and photographers converged on the
courtroom where Bruno Hauptmann was being tried,
the competition among the journalists was so fierce
that many used hidden cameras to shoot still photos
of the witnesses in defiance of a court order prohibiting such activities."0
The media outpouring surrounding the
Hauptmann trial led to the adoption by the American
Bar Association of Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics in 1937." The Canon declared that proceedings
in court were to be conducted with "dignity and
decorum.'

2

Photography, whether during court ses-

sions or during recess, as well as radio broadcasts,
were deemed to "detract from the essential dignity of
the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions... in the mind of the public and should
not be permitted."'" In 1941, Canon 35 was amended
expressly to prohibit radio broadcasts from the courtroom, and again in 1952 to prohibit television broadcasts."
As reflected in the ABA rules and regulations,
courts were initially concerned with the physical
encumbrance on the courtroom setting caused by
electronic broadcasting.'" Broadcast technology largely
was in its infancy stage until the 1960s, and as a
result, both still photography and motion picture cameras were bulky and required bright lighting to be
effective.' The mere presence of media journalists in
court was distracting and annoying to all of the parties present to participate in or view the trial.
Concerns surfaced in the 1960s regarding the constitutional rights of a defendant faced with a barrage
of television cameras. The case of Estes v. Texas provided the United States Supreme Court its first opportunity to examine the constitutional problems presented by cameras in the courtroom. 17 During the 1965
trial of a defendant indicted by a Texas county grand
jury for swindling, the court allowed a booth to be
erected in the courtroom in which television cameras
and equipment were to be limited.', Although only
the State's opening and closing arguments and the
jury verdict were broadcast live, the videotape coverage of the entire trial was extensively broadcasted
during regularly scheduled news programs. Both the
trial court and the Appellate Court of Texas rejected
Estes' claim that he had been denied his due process
rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment
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as a result of the televising of his trial.19
In reversing Estes' conviction on due process
grounds, 2 the Supreme Court recognized the tension
between the First Amendment grant of freedom of the
press2' and a defendant's right to be free from the use
of television equipment in the courtroom that would
potentially jeopardize a fair trial.' Justice Clark, writing for the majority, said that the "circus-like atmosphere created by broadcasters in the courtroom" during the defendant's pretrial hearing and trial deprived
Estes of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and
his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.21 The Court enumerated the aspects of
television coverage which, in its opinion, contributed
to the unfair result for Estes. These aspects included:
(1) improper influence on the impartiality of jurors by
emphasizing the notoriety of the trial;24 (2) influencing
the demeanor and delivery of witnesses; 5 (3) distracting judges"6; and (4) imposing "pressures" on the
defendant similar to those imposed by a "police line27
up.
The Estes Court suggested, however, it would
reconsider its position on cameras in the courtroom if
the technology became less intrusive.28 In the years
following Estes, television underwent dramatic
changes as cameras became smaller and more manageable. The need for a bright lighting source significantly diminished, as did the need for bulky transmitter cables. In addition, by the late 1960s and early
1970s, television replaced newspapers as the primary
source of information for the American public.29
The door was opened for experimentation with
electronic media coverage of state trials with the 1981
Supreme Court decision in Chandler v. Florida.' At
the time of trial, Florida had the most liberal rules in
effect regarding broadcast of trial proceedings." The
defendants, Miami Beach police officers convicted of
conspiracy to commit burglary and grand larceny, 2
appealed their convictions claiming that the televising
of parts of their trial denied them a fair and impartial
trial.3 Florida's Appellate Court affirmed the lower
court's decision finding there was no evidence that
the television broadcasts hampered the defendants in
the presentation of their case or impaired the fairness
of the trial." The Florida Supreme Court denied
35
review.
Reviewing the Chandlerappeal on a grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
despite the defendants' objection to the presence of
the electronic media, Florida could permit television
broadcasts without violating the defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights." It interpreted the earlier Estes
decision as not imposing an absolute ban on television coverage of trials or on state experimentation
with emerging television technology.37 Absent a showing of prejudice to the constitutional rights of the
defendants, the Court was reluctant to endorse or
invalidate Florida's experimental television presence

69
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in its courtrooms.38

Nevertheless, the Court did articulate parameters
by which a violation of a defendant's due process
could be measured in similar situations: (1) if the
presence of television cameras "compromised the
ability of the jury to judge the defendant fairly;" or (2)
if "broadcast coverage of [the] particular case ha[s] an
adverse impact on the trial participants sufficient to
constitute a denial of due process." 9 The defendant
was required to demonstrate "prejudice of [a] constitutional dimension" for the media coverage to be
deemed a due process violation. 40 The defendants in
Chandlerfailed to demonstrate that they had been
unduly prejudiced by the broadcast of their trial.
THE FEDERAL COURT TV EXPERIMENT
At the time of the Chandlerdecision in 1981, only
twenty-seven states allowed limited courtroom access
to electronic media.4" Today, due in large part to the
increasing sophistication of both the electronic media
and the viewing audience, forty-five states allow television cameras into court with varying degrees of
accessibility. 2 Presently, the District of Columbia,
Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina and
South Dakota are the only jurisdictions to retain an
3
absolute ban on electronic media coverage.
A potentially historic step in the relationship
between the television media and the court occurred
July 1, 1991, when six federal district courts and two
federal appellate courts broke tradition and opened
their corridors to television cameras." Previously, the
American Bar Association Judicial Canon 3A(7) 4" and
its amendments were interpreted to shield federal
courtrooms from television access altogether. 6
Although judicial canons are not legally binding, the
legal profession recognizes them as the primary standards by which the decorum and integrity of the legal
process are measured. 47 However, in 1990, the Judicial
Conference of the United States,"' the governing body
of the federal courts, adopted an experimentation
with television broadcasts of federal civil court proceedings for a period from July 1, 1991 until June 30,
1994.-9 The Judicial Conference's actions were motivated by its desire to "open the courts to public
scrutiny [and] develop [its own] guidelines for audiovisual coverage before Congress imposed its own."9
The federal district court systems which agreed to
participate in the television experiment include the
Southern District of Indiana, the District of
Massachusetts, the Eastern District of Michigan, the
Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and the Western District of
Washington." Pilot programs also are being tried in
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Manhattan and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.5 2
According to the rules governing the federal
experiment program, the court must be provided with
"reasonable advance notice" of a media request to
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televise a trial.53 Broadcasters must use a "pool" system where only one news organization is responsible
for the actual live film footage being broadcast from
the courtroom to all of the interested media' and are
prohibited from filming the jury or any conference
between attorneys and their clients or between counsel and the judge. The presiding judge, at his or her
discretion may "refuse, limit or terminate media coverage" of the trial to protect the rights of the parties,
the witnesses, and "the dignity of the court.""
However, the permission or denial of television
access to a federal court does not "create any litigable
rights or right to appellate review."5 7
Since its inception, the federal courts' foray into
television broadcasting has met with modest success,
particularly in the Southern District of New York5"
However, the conspicuous absence of debate over
the program following its introduction may signal a
disinterest by the public in federal court proceedings.
One commentator points to the ban on covering federal criminal trials as the cause.' Under both the rules
implemented by the Judicial Conference that govern
the experiment and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, broadcasting of federal criminal trials is
expressly prohibited ° But arguably, criminal matters
can be more easily followed by both broadcast news
organizations and the viewing public than civil trials."'
Civil matters may also be "less compelling and have
less news value"62 than the more newsworthy federal
prosecutions. However, the question of television
coverage of federal courts should not be based solely
on the number of viewers who watch the courtroom
drama on their televisions. "Leaving the issue of
(courtroom) press... access entirely to the tug and
pull of the market is both unseemly and unwise,"'
notes Washington D.C. attorney Timothy B. Dyk, who
represents several media organizations lobbying for
elimination of the electronic media access ban.
Rather, the decision to make the experiment a permanent part of the federal system should be predicated
upon the effect it has on the court, the participating
parties, and the public. The federal courts and the
state courts interested in granting television cameras a
permanent access status must engage in a balancing
of concerns of the parties as enumerated by the
Chandler Court.
A BALANCE OF CONCERNS
The ChandlerCourt set the standards by which
federal and state courts must strive to strike a balance
between the interests of the litigating parties and the
interests of the public via the media. The struggle that
courts engage in to find this fair and just balance of
concerns, however, is significant due, in large part, to
the lack of clear balancing guidelines. The court's
struggle was evidenced in United States v. Torres,
where the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ultimately denied the
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request of the National Broadcasting Company (NBC)
and the American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) to
use videotape and audiotape equipment during the
trial of two Puerto Rican patriots charged with conspiracy against the United States.1 However, the court
subsequently allowed NBC and ABC post-trial access
to the audiotapes and videotapes introduced into evidence by the prosecution, based on a finding that the
defendants had not demonstrated that justice required
withholding of the tapes in contravention to the
strong common law right of the public to inspect and
disseminate judicial records. 5
Determining that in-court media coverage would
endanger the Torres defendants' right to a fair trial,
District Judge George Leighton remarked, "[t]o begin
this trial from the posture of allowing two of the
country's leading broadcast corporations instantaneous access to dramatic evidence that casts invidious
reflections on the defendants is to start this trial on
the wrong footing."61 Lacking clear precedent, the
court found the use of cameras in the courtroom was
an unallowable intrusion on the trial process; it based
its ruling on a spectrum of authority, including the
decisions of both Estes and Chandler,the Judicial
Canon 3A(7), the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
53, and Rule 1.52 of the General Rules of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois"7 Acknowledging that the principal purpose of
the trial judge is assuring fairness to all participants in
the courtroom, Judge Leighton nevertheless
explained:
A criminal trial is not designed as a
forum in which entities of the news
media can flex their First Amendment
muscles. Nor is it a device attuned to the
task of education absent members of the
public to what occurs in a particular
criminal case, selected by broadcasting
corporations for attention in accordance
with their standard of what is newsworthy.(-8
The Torres court's decision served as a reminder
to the television media that, under several strands of
authority, its access to courtrooms is not an absolute
right. However, while the court properly engaged in a
balancing of the interests of the various parties, by
allowing after-the-fact media access to trial evidence,
it seemed to mitigate its purpose in protecting the
defendants' fairness and due process interests in the
first place. Thus, as televised courtroom proceedings
increase in their popularity, the need for more clearly
defined judicial guidelines is apparent.
Public interest in, or perhaps real awareness of,
television access to courtrooms surged in late 1991
and early 1992 with the successive broadcasts of the
William Kennedy Smith rape trial in Florida in
December 1991, the murder trial of Jeffrey Dahmer in
January 1992, and the trial of the Los Angeles County
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police officers accused of beating Rodney King in
March 1992. While under a Chandleranalysis these
three televised trials raised no threats to the respective
defendants' rights to fair trials and the due process of
law, they did reignite debate over the rights of the
parties involved in a court proceeding to have privacy
from the camera's unblinking eye. Concerns were
raised regarding whether the broadcasting of "real
life" courtroom drama was truly education or whether
it merely panders to a public's prurient interest.
Finally, questions continue to be raised regarding the
level of freedom or restrictions to be granted to the
broadcast media in light of a balancing of the above
factors.
"Americans have been courtroom television
addicts for years."69 From PerryMason to Matlock, L.A.

Law to Law & Order,the television viewing audience
has been intrigued by court proceedings that ultimately decide "Who done it?" Interestingly, the very date
on which television cameras were allowed into federal courts as part of the experimental program, the
nation's first television network devoted exclusively to
coverage of federal and state court proceedings went
on the air. The Court Television Network (Court TV)'4
broadcasts twenty-four hours of courtroom coverage
in a style that was initially forecasted by former Chief
Justice Warren Burger. As early as 1986, Burger considered allowing television coverage of federal court
proceedings "if there was a way to broadcast the
entire proceeding" in a style similar to C-SPAN's cov7
erage of the House and Senate. '
In December 1991, over 3 million viewers
watched the unfolding rape trial of William Kennedy
Smith on the Cable News Network (CNN) or on Court
TV, both of which carried the trial live. ra The opponents of cameras in court decried the broadcasts as
intrusive on the privacy interest of both the victim
and the accused.7 3 Due to the fact that television is
viewed as a more influential medium than print, critics argue that the privacy interests of trial participants
should allow for the exclusion of television cameras
in court even when the press generally is not excluded.7
Based on the nature of a rape trial, the accuser is
often required to reveal highly personal, and often
embarrassing, facts in an open court. 71 "Gavel-to-gavel
coverage [may] magnify the misery... as the accuser's
face is concealed on camera in a way that protects
6
her dignity but also turns her into a cipher."7
However, proponents of television access to trials,
including rape trials, counter the argument by pointing to the testimony of the alleged victim in the Smith
trial, who was not required in either direct or crossexamination to expose her personal sexual history.7
Critics also asserted that the broadcasting of trials
merely serves the prurient interest of the public.-" One
commentator pointed out that the CNN network regu-

larly interrupted its programming of the Kennedy
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Smith trial for commercial breaks, often during critical
live testimony. 9 National network news programs and
local news stations were criticized for airing sexually
graphic testimony during their news programs, yet
these same networks refuse to broadcast condom
commercials.9
Steven Brill, the founder of Court TV, believes that
while some viewers may watch the courtroom trials
for voyeuristic reasons, the very fact that the trial stories being aired involve the true lives of real people
will be both interesting and educational.8 1 Viewers of
the William Kennedy Smith trial may have learned
that courtroom testimony, demeanor and delivery are
crucial to the presentation of a credible case.$2 Brill
believes that broadcasts of real trials strip away the
public's conception that all trials climax in a "moment
of truth," as do fictional courtroom dramas.83
Furthermore, he notes that the judge, attorneys and
jury do not seem to be affected by the presence of
television cameras." He asserts that, by bringing trials
into homes of viewers via television, a lay audience
has the opportunity to watch a "solemn" and "marvelously fair, judicious process.""5
Finally, while the television media may be properly excluded from highly sensitive court proceedings,
such as juvenile trials and domestic relations disputes,
it is arguable that the level of freedom granted to television cameras, particularly in federal courts, should
continue to be expanded rather than reduced. A caseby-case determination by the judge, where the arguments raised by the parties may be considered but
would not be controlling, will sufficiently protect both
private and public interests.
Based upon a presumption of television media
access to the courtroom under a First Amendment
privilege, one commentator noted the standard of
strict scrutiny should be applied by courts in determining whether cameras may properly be excluded.,'
Generally, the court would have the responsibility of
determining whether "the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."8 In Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court overturned a
state statute that mandated exclusion of the press from
trials of specified sexual offenses involving victims
under the age of eighteen." While the Court made it
clear the First Amendment does not absolutely bar the
exclusion of cameras in court, it noted the exclusion
decision must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the state's interest in protecting "minor
victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embar59
rassment."1
Although opponents of the case-by-case
approach to television access fear defendants will be
solely at the mercy of the judge's discretion, the adoption of a strict scrutiny test will provide some measure
of certainty in the outcome of the decision.
In addition, procedural safeguards and rules
should be established to allow defendants to make an
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interlocutory appeal of a pre-trial decision to allow
cameras in court. 90The Chandlercourt acknowledged
that a post-trial appeal of television access was a poor
remedy considering that any harm to the defendant
may have already occurred; however, it still upheld
Florida's access rule which provided for appeal only
after-the-fact.91 By mandating the application of a strict
scrutiny test to television media access on a case-bycase basis and by providing defendants with the right
to an interlocutory appeal, the courts will have some
parameters by which they may effectively balance the
concerns of the parties involved.
Consent of the litigating parties to allow television
broadcasts of their trial invokes several problems and
therefore should not be adopted as a bar to camera
access. 9 It is foreseeable that a unanimous consent
requirement would effectively exclude the public
entirely from court proceedings, thus interfering with
both the public's right to know and the media's presumptive privilege under the First Amendment.
However, although the parties themselves should not
be given the unilateral power to exclude cameras
from the courtroom, it is arguable that witnesses
should be given such rights. Presently, fourteen
states 9 allow witnesses to ban the televising of their
testimony under the justification that witnesses differ
from defendants in "the circumstances leading to their
attendance in court." 1 The rationale behind allowing
the witness exception to televised proceedings is that
witnesses may be reluctant to testify or will alter their
testimony if exposed to public scrutiny via television.' '
A defendant, on the other hand, may not want his or
her trial televised, but as long as there is no due
process violation the cameras will be allowed and the
defendant must be present. Thus, televising a defendant's testimony will not have the same potentially
detrimental effect to the criminal justice process as
will the televising of a witness' testimony9
CONCLUSION
Over the last three decades, the United States judicial system has recognized the power of the television
media in reaching the public and has slowly allowed
television cameras in both federal and state courtrooms. With the increasing acceptance of television
cameras in court, however, comes the responsibility
of the court system to better guide its trial judges as to
when it is appropriate to allow or restrict media
access. A strict scrutiny approach on a case-by-case
basis will best protect the interests of all parties
involved. Access to an interlocutory appeal of the
court's decision will serve as an added safeguard for
defendants. And, finally, the court should be allowed
to restrict television coverage on a limited in-court
basis where the privacy concerns of a witness would
be infringed.
Generally, it is in the interest of the public, the litigating parties, and the justice system to continue to
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allow television coverage of trials. The public receives

an education into the workings of the legal system
through real civil suits and criminal trials. The litigat-

ing parties have the opportunity to have their story
related to the public in their own words, with the

public acting as a true jury of their peers. Finally, the
justice system receives a check on its actions knowing
that the eyes of the public are upon it.
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